University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 2 Winter 2005

Article 3

2005

Speech: Citing Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Is Our
Sovereignty Really at Stake?
Peter J. Messitte
Judge, United States District Court for the District of Maryland

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Messitte, Peter J. (2005) "Speech: Citing Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Is Our Sovereignty Really at Stake?," University of Baltimore Law
Review: Vol. 35: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol35/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

EDITOR'S NOTE
CITING FOREIGN LAW IN U.S. COURTS:
IS OUR SOVEREIGNTY REALLY AT STAKE?
The Honorable Peter J. Messitte has served on the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland since 1993, when President
Clinton appointed him to the position. Judge Messitte received his
bachelor's degree cum laude from Amherst College in 1963 and went
on to receive his law degree from the University of Chicago Law
School in 1966. Interestingly, Judge Messitte did not enter the practice of law after graduation, but instead joined the Peace Corps as a
volunteer in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Mter returning from Brazil, Judge
Messitte worked in private practice for fourteen years. In 1985, he
joined the Montgomery County Circuit Court as an Associate Judge.
While in this position, Judge Messitte established Maryland's first divorce roundtable, in which lawyers, social workers, and psychiatrists
discussed issues concerning the effects of divorce.
Judge Messitte's work also extends to helping developing countries
establish independent judicial systems. From 1997 to 2003, Judge
Messitte was a member of the International Judicial Relations Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. In this Committee, Judge Messitte chaired the Working Group for Latin America
and the Caribbean. He has also acted as a consultant for judicial reform projects in Mrica and Turkey. The following is a speech Judge
Messitte presented on the influence of the U.S. Constitution in other
countries and the relevance of foreign law in interpreting the Constitution. This speech was part of the University of Baltimore's Constitution Day celebration on September 20, 2005.

CITING FOREIGN LAW IN U.S. COURTS:
IS OUR SOVEREIGNTY REALLY AT STAKE?
The Honorable Peter J. Messitte
Judge, United States District Court for the
District of Maryland
September 20, 2005
Dean Holmes, Professor Higgenbotham, Members of the Faculty
and Students of the University of Baltimore Law School, Ladies and
Gentlemen:
I'm honored to have been asked to speak to you on Constitution
Day. There are so many things one could say about the remarkable
document that is our Great Charter. But over the last several years I
have had a special opportunity to consider the influence of our Constitution abroad-its internationalization, so to speak-and in the
time allotted to me this evening, I'd like to share with you some of my
perspectives in that regard. I want to start by telling you a story, probably apocryphal, but one which illustrates rather well the tension in
this area.
Some years ago, the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln was cruising in the North Atlantic when it received a radio signal from the
Canadians telling the Americans to divert their course 15 degrees
south to avoid a collision. The Americans responded: "We suggest
you divert your course 15 degrees north to avoid collision." The
Canadians responded: "Repeat. Divert your course 15 degrees south."
The Americans replied: "We insist you divert." Another round of this
and finally the Americans responded: "We are the USS Abraham Lincoln, the second largest aircraft carrier in the U.S. Navy. We are accompanied by two destroyers and three submarines. We insist you
divert your course or we will be required to take appropriate action."
To which the Canadians replied:
''Your call.
We are a lighthouse."
Hold that thought, as they say. I'll come back to it several minutes
from now.
Let us return to the Constitution.
Can there be any doubt, as Professor Albert P. Blaustein once wrote,
that our Constitution is "[America's] most important export?"I
1. Albert P. Blaustein, The United States Constitution: A Model in Nation-Building,
54 PHI KAPPA PHI FORUM 4, 14 (1984).
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Virtually from its beginning more than 200 years ago, our Constitution had influence beyond our borders-in France, then throughout
Europe-in Poland, Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Spain, Portugal-and in Latin America. These countries were attracted not only by the idea of constitutionalism, but by the concepts
of federalism, separation of powers, judicial review, and the recognition and protection of fundamental rights. We were not even doing
much "exporting" in the early days. People came to our shores to
observe and analyze what we had accomplished. De Tocqueville's Democracy in America, based on his study and travel here, put in bold
relief our constitutional institutions, especially federalism and judicial
review.
During the 19th century, countries, such as Argentina, copied our
institutions almost down to the letter. Argentina's Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Naci6n was fashioned nearly identically after our own
Supreme Court, with nine justices, the power of judicial review and a
provision for discretionary review akin to our notion of certiorari.
Our Constitution was also enormously influential in shaping governmental structures in the wake of the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe.
In time, of course, we did become active exporters of the Constitution. Mter the Spanish-American War, the U.S. exercised sovereign
authority in the Philippines and many of our constitutional concepts
were implanted there. By World War I, Woodrow Wilson spoke of
making the world "safe for democracy." And aJustice of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany has written that: "At
no time since 1848 was political and legal thought in Germany more
intensely preoccupied with American thought than after World
War II. This is particularly true with regard to American
constitutionalism."2
In occupied Japan after World War II, the American approach to
constitutionalism (especially federalism, judicial review and the protection of fundamental rights) had a similarly decisive influence.
American concepts of rights, more particularly the Bill of Rights,
have also had a profound impact upon international organizations. It
was largely at the insistence of the United States that the framers of
the U.N. Charter in San Francisco in 1945 included references to
human rights, and Eleanor Roosevelt, it will be recalled, chaired the
Commission that helped draft the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. India looked to American constitutional concepts as it
emerged as an independent nation.
In our own time, American assistance to the development of democracies and the drafting of constitutions has been extraordinarily ex2. Helmut Steinberger, American Constitutionalism and German Constitutional Development, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 199, 212 (Louis Henkin & Albert].
Rosenthal eds., 1990).
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tensive-in post-communist countries, as well as in countries that have
emerged from dictatorships, especially in Latin America and Mrica.
Many of you have no doubt heard of the American Bar Association's
Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI), sponsored by
the U.S. Agency for International Development, through which
professors, lawyers, and judges spend considerable time engaged as
constitutional consultants in that part of the world. In the last twelve
months, I myself have been invited to Argentina and Peru to discuss
how the concept of certiorari works in our Supreme Court.
And continuously through all of this-as well might be expectedthe high courts of virtually of all these countries and more recently
regional tribunals such as the European and Inter-American Courts of
Human Rights-have with profound respect, quoted from the decisions of our Supreme Court. This has especially been true as these
courts have had to interpret norms derived from our Bill of Rights,
principally in four areas: procedural justice and due process of law;
equal treatment under the law; freedom of expression; and the right
to privacy. One brief example will suffice. In 1993, a Kurdish union
leader, Munir Ceylan, was sentenced to prison in Turkey for writing a
newspaper article urging political action against the Turkish government's policies concerning the Kurdish people. In 2000, the European Court of Human Rights found Ceylan's punishment to be a
violation of human rights, and in so doing, the court quoted the
words of someone it called "one of the mightiest constitutional jurists
of all time," Oliver Wendell Holmes. The European court, in fact,
cited several U.S. Supreme Court cases, including Brandenburg v.
Ohio,3 which is so much in our own news today.
All of this is by way of background-ironic background, I should
say-to a circumstance that has generated a great deal of heat (and
less light) in recent times-the citation of foreign sources by certain
members of the Supreme Court as an aid to interpreting our own
Constitution-especially when it comes to interpreting questions of
fundamental liberties, given, as Jeffrey Toobin noted in a very recent
edition of the New Yorker, that countries abroad sometimes "tend to be
more progressive than those at home."4
You would think that this would be a straightforward, innocent, not
particularly complex debate, touching upon such issues as:
1) The extent to which foreign law sources should be cited in
our constitutional cases.
2) What is meant by foreign law? And whose law? England's?
The European Court of Human Rights's? Zimbabwe's (Don't
laugh)?
3. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
4. Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law
Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42.
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3) If foreign law is to be cited, for what purpose? For persuasive
effect only? For precedential value, even if limited?
In January of this year, Justices Breyer and Scalia held a debate at
Washington College of Law, American University, that was broadcast
over C-SPAN. It was a civil debate. Maybe a bit too much laughter by
both and a bit too much interrupting by Justice Scalia. But basically a
civil debate.
But the debate has not been as straightforward, simple, and innocent as you might expect.
In May of 2004, the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
House Judiciary Committee passed a nonbinding resolution, Number
568, sponsored by Congressmen Feeney and Goodlatte and 59 Republican co-sponsors, which was entitled the "Reaffirmation of American
Independence Resolution."5 Let me read it to you:
RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that
judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of
the United States should not be based on judgments, laws, or
pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign
judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United States.
Whereas the Declaration of Independence announced that
one of the chief causes of the American Revolution was that
King George had "combined to subject us to a jurisdiction
foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged by our
laws;"
Whereas the Supreme Court has recently relied on the judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions to
support its interpretations of the laws of the United States,
most recently in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2474
(2003);
Whereas the Supreme Court has stated previously in Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n. 11 (1997), that "We think
such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution ... ;"
Whereas Americans' ability to live their lives within clear legal boundaries is the foundation of the rule of law, and essential to freedom;
Whereas it is the appropriate judicial role to faithfully interpret the expression of the popular will through laws enacted
5. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Congo (2004).
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by duly elected representatives of the American people and
our system of checks and balances;
Whereas Americans should not have to look for guidance on
how to live their lives from the often contradictory decisions
of any of hundreds of other foreign organizations; and
Whereas inappropriate judicial reliance on foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements threatens the sovereignty of
the United States, the separation of powers and the President's and the Senate's treaty-making authority: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives
that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the
laws of the United States should not be based in whole or in
part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements are incorporated into the legislative history of laws
passed by the elected legislative branches of the United
States or otherwise inform an understanding of the original
meaning of the laws of the United States. 6
Congressman Feeney offered these remarks at the hearing that led
to the resolution:
Increasingly Federal Judges, including six U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, have expressed disappointment in the Constitution we inherited from the framers, and disdain for certain
laws enacted by democratically elected Representatives.
With disturbing frequency, they have simply imported law
from foreign jurisdictions, looking for more agreeable laws
or judgments in the approximately 191 recognized countries
in the world. They champion this practice and fancy themselves players on the international scene of jurisprudential
thought. In their recent speeches, several Justices have referred to the "globalization of human rights" and assuming a
"comparative analysis" when interpreting our constitution.
Is this a proper role for our United States judges?'
Congressman Feeney also had this to say on MSNBC: "This resolution advises the courts that it is improper for them to substitute foreign law for American law or the American Constitution. To the
extent they deliberately ignore Congress's admonishment, they are no
longer engaging in good behavior within the meaning of the Constitu6. Id.
7. The Courts and International Law: Hearing on Markup of H.R Res. 568 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Tudiciary, 108th Congo
(2004), available at http://www.house.gov/feeney/rlown!oads/reaffirm/tf
statementmarkup5-13-4 (statement of Rep. Feeney, Member, House
Comm. on the Judiciary).
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tion and may subject themselves to the ultimate remedy, which would
be impeachment."s
A resolution identical to Resolution 568-Resolution 97-was introduced by Congressman Feeney on February 15, 2005, with approximately the same number of co-sponsors, and is currently pending
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution. 9 Congressman Poe of Texas, a former trial judge and instructor in constitutional law and a supporter of the new resolution, had this to say:
Using foreign court decisions across the board would create,
of course, judicial chaos, judicial anarchy. But yet the Supreme Court does exactly this. Why should the Supreme
Court be left to its own devices? If there is any other standard other than the Constitution, th[e]n what is next?
Mr. Speaker, looking to foreign court decisions is as relevant
as using the writings in "Reader's Digest," a Sears and Roebuck catalogue, a horoscope, my grandmother's recipe for
the common cold, looking at tea leaves, star gazing, or the
local gossip at the barber shop in Cut N' Shoot, Texas. Mr.
Speaker, has the Supreme Court lost its way?lO
And Congressman Sensenbrenner, Chair of the full House Judiciary
Committee, in a very recent speech at Stanford University, said this
about courts citing foreign sources of authority in their rulings:
As I touched upon in the speech before the Judicial Conference last March, America's sovereignty and the integrity of
our legal process are threatened by a jurisprudence predicated upon laws and judicial decisions alien to our Constitution and foreign to our system of self-government.
Federal courts have increasingly utilized foreign sources of
law, as well as international opinion to interpret the United
States Constitution. If this trend takes root in our legal culture, Americans might be governed "by laws of other nations
or international bodies that Congress and the President have
expressly rejected. Inappropriate judicial adherence to foreign laws and tribunals threatens American sovereignty, unsettles the separation of powers, presidential and Senate
treaty-making authority, and undermines the legitimacy of
the judicial process.

***

I am pleased to support as an original cosponsor a resolution
that will receive Committee consideration in the coming
8. Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreig;n Matter at the Supreme Court, MSNBC, Mar. 11,
2004, available at http://www.house.gov /feeney /msnbcresolutionarticle.
htm.
9. H.R. Res. 97, I09th Congo (2005).
10. Representative Ted Poe, Has the Supreme Court Lost its Way?, speech from the
House Floor Uune 13, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/poe/remarks/ supremecourt6I305.htm.
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months. This resolution reasserts the primacy of the United
States, reaffirms the principles that informed America's Declaration of Independence, and safeguards the sovereignty for
which America's Founding generation and those who have
followed have fought and died.u
What are we talking about here? Apart from citing relevant public
international law (or private international) in a given case, we're talking about certain justices citing foreign law for its persuasive valuenever for its binding effect-in a very limited way in a handful of Supreme Court cases, although-to be sure-some controversial ones.
We're talking about Roper v. Simmons, which held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on
offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed. 12 We're talking about Lawrence v. Texas, which overturned
state law making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage
in certain intimate sexual contact;13 Atkins v. Virginia, that dealt with
the execution of mentally retarded offenders;14 Grutter v. Bollinger,
that concerned racial and ethnic diversity policies in higher education;15 and Knight v. Florida, regarding excessive delay in execution. 16
Let's look at these cases:
4) In Roper, Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority of five, spent
eighteen pages reviewing Supreme Court precedents and the
practices of the various fifty States. In his last four pages, he also
noted that since the case of Trop v. Dulles,17 the Court "ha[d]
referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments"'18 and observed that the U.S. was "the only country in
the world that continue[d] to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty."19 He went on to cite international authorities, including a few conventions that the U.S. either never
signed or signed with reservations. 20 But, on behalf of the five
Justices who signed on to his opinion,Justice Kennedy also said,
"the opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
11. Representative F.James Sensenbrenner,Jr., Zale Lecture in Public Policy at
Stanford University (May 9, 2005), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
medial pdfs/ stanfordjudgesspeech pressversion505. pdf.
12. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
13. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
14. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
15. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
16. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999).
17. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
18. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (2005).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1199.
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outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation
of our own conclusions."21
Even Justice O'Connor, in dissent, said,
[T]his Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity
certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at
odds with, the values in other countries. . . . At least, the
existence of an international consensus of this nature can
serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus. The instant case presents no such
domestic consensus, however, and the recent emergence of
an otherwise global consensus does not alter that basic fact. 22
On the other hand,Justice Scalia, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas, said "the basic premise of the Court's argumentthat American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world
- ought to be rejected out of hand."23
5) In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy, for the majority, in two short
paragraphs out of a thirty page opinion, referred to the repeal of
laws punishing homosexual conduct in Great Britain and the
case of Dudgeon v. u.K., from the European Court of Human
Rights, which held such laws invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights. 24
Justice Scalia, in contrast, characterized this reference to foreign
law as "meaningless dicta, dangerous dicta however," and spoke of the
impropriety of imposing "foreign moods, fads or fashions on Americans" -quoting Justice Thomas from an earlier case. 25
But it should be noted that the m<yority in Lawrence was writing primarily to refute Chief Justice Burger who had said in Bowers v. HardwicJi26 that bans on gay sex were "firmly rooted in Judea-Christian
moral and ethical standards."27 Lawrence also suggested that European conceptions of "human freedom" could help shed light on our
understanding of the concept in our own country.28
6) In Atkins, in a footnote, along with references to organizations
with germane expertise such as the American Psychological Association, and to widely diverse religious communities in the
U.S.-Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist-and to polls
among Americans, Justice Stevens for a majority of six, stated
that "within the world community, the imposition of the death
penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.

27.
28.

Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1215-16 (O·Connor.]., dissenting).
Id. at 1226 (Scalia, J.. dissenting).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
Id. at 598 (Scalia. J.. dissenting).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 196.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-78.
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overwhelmingly disapproved."29 There was also reference to an
amicus brief that had been filed by the European Union. 30
Chief Justice Rehnquist found little support in precedent and the
antithesis of federalism "to place weight on foreign laws .... "31 Justice
Scalia took issue with the majority's reference to the "so-called world
community" and other non-domestic legal sources saying it took the
"Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate a 'national consensus. . . .' "32
But what had the majority done? Had it imported "foreign law?"
Had it said anything like, "We're bound to follow it?"
7) In Crutter, the only reference to foreign law was in a concurring
opinion by Justice Ginsburg who, in a single paragraph, referred to
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, which had been ratified by the U.S. in
1994, which she cited because it endorsed the principle that certain measures might be in favor of certain racial groups for the
purpose of guaranteeing their rights. 33 True, she also cited as in
accord the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, adopted by 170 nations,34 but
not by the U.S. 35
But why did she cite it? Simply to agree with the majority opinion
that "race-conscious programs 'must have a logical endpoint.' "36
8) Knight v. Florida was not a merits opinion. It was Justice Breyer
dissenting from the denial of certiorari in a case raising the issue
of excessive delay in executing an individual. He cited opinions
from the Privy Council in England, from India, Canada, and
from-in what he later called "a tactical error"-a case from
Zimbabwe, which as he later conceded, is "not the human rights
capital of the world." But all he said was that the opinions of
these courts might be "useful."
There have been other causes of concern to some Congressmen.
They have cited speeches by such "transnationalist" justices as Justice O'Connor, who in Atlanta in October, 2003, said:
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
Id.
Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
Id. at 347 (Scalia, j., dissenting).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, j., concurring).
United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited
March 10, 2006) (listing the states that have signed and ratified the Convention). As of March 2, 2006, 182 countries are party to the Convention
and the United States has still not ratified it. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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I suspect that with time, we will rely increasingly on international and foreign law in resolving what now appear to be
domestic issues, as we both appreciate more fully the ways in
which domestic issues have international dimension, and recognize the rich resources available to us in the decisions of
foreign courts. 37
Of course Justice O'Connor also said (in a caveat not as frequently
quoted) that: "[C]onclusions reached by other countries and by the
international community, although not formally binding upon our decisions, should at times constitute persuasive authority in American
courts .... "38
Justice Ginsburg has spoken to similar effect.
Let's consider why some Congressmen, law professors, and commentators object to when Justices cite foreign law.
- It violates the doctrine of separation of powers, they say.
Judges are supposed to interpret U.S. law and foreign law only
insofar as the Constitution or statutory law allow. Congress, in
contrast, may look to foreign law for whatever models it
chooses.
Citing foreign law undermines our distinctive Constitution,
they argue. Foreign laws emerge from different historical, social, and cultural settings.
They believe that citing foreign law is selective, i.e., Justices
look almost always to Europe, sometimes Canada, and only as
to rights the Justices favor (e.g., gay rights or abortion). There
is no principled way to distinguish what law to cite for what
purpose.
Citing foreign law, they suggest, encourages judicial activism.
Judges will find pretexts for abandoning existing precedents
and launching in new directions.
- Finally, citing foreign law undermines respect for law. The
Constitution is "our" law. "[O]ver time ... [there's] a danger
of dissolving the affections that Americans have for their own
Constitution."39 (This is a thesis of Professor John McGinnis of
Northwestern University Law School.)
There are responses to these concerns, of course:
37. Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the
United States, Remarks at the Southern Center for International Studies
(Oct. 28, 2003), available at http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_
transcript. pdf.
38. Id.
39. Appropriate Rnle ofFMeignjudgments in the Interpretation ofAmerican Law: Hearing on H.R Res. 568 BefMe the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on
the judiciary, 108th Congo (2004), available at http:/ / commdocs.house.gov/
committees/judiciary/hju92673.000/hju92673_0.HTM (testimony of Professor John McGinnis).
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Leave aside concepts of international law relative to "war" or
"treaties" or "conventions," which everyone agrees are relevant.
Leave aside cases interpreting Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to define and punish offenses against the law of nations (e.g., piracy).
There are no other instances where Supreme Court Justices
ever cited foreign law as binding upon them.
Citing foreign law for persuasive effect is no different from citing other persuasive authority, (e.g., lower federal court cases,
state court cases, law review articles, even literary sources).
The fact that foreign sources could be abused is not an argument that they should not be used at all, only that they must be
used with integrity.
Reliance on foreign law is consistent with our earliest traditions. The Declaration of Independence, for example, says
that "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that
they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation,"40 and goes on to speak of "truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal .... "41 Chief Justice John Marshall,
in Thirty Hogsheads oj Sugar v. Boyle,42 wrote that "the decisions
of the Courts of every country, so far as they are founded upon
a law common to every country, will be received, not as authority, but with respect."43
And there have been several other cases of similar tenor.
Foreign law can also be cited for its negative effect, as Justice
Jackson, concurring, did in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 44 President Truman had ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate steel mills.45 Justice Jackson cited
the Weimar Constitution after World War I, which gave Germany's President the right to suspend any and all rights when
public safety and order might be endangered. 46 When Hitler
persuaded President Von Hindenberg to suspend all such
rights, they were never restored. 47
Telling judges how to interpret law also strikes "at the core of
the judicial process." It isn't judges citing foreign law that violates the doctrine of separation of powers. It's telling judges
they can't cite foreign law that violates the doctrine.
And one might add another argument: Resistance to citing
foreign law is yet one more manifestation of the clash between

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Id. at para. 2.
13 U.S. (l Cranch) 191 (1815).
Id. at 198.
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
45. Id. at 582.
46. Id. at 651 Uackson,j., concurring).
47. Id.

para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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strict constructionists, i.e., originalists (e.g., Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas, on the one hand, plus the some sixty House
Republicans) and the non-originalists who see the Constitution
as a living, constantly evolving document. If you look closely at
the Resolution 568 and Resolution 97, you will see that they
don't refer to citation of foreign law by the Supreme Court
alone, but by judges in general; that the resolutions are not
limited to constitutional interpretation but to ')udicial interpretations regarding the laws of the United States;" and that
they single out original intent as the only legitimate method of
judicial interpretation.
Opposition to citing foreign law, I submit, is not just wrong-headed.
It looks very much like an effort at mind-control. It is simply one
more shot across the bow at the Judiciary by Congress seeking to intrude on judicial independence.
- Recall the Feeney Amendment (the same fellow behind Resolution 97 and Resolution 568) that required federal judges to
justify departures from the sentencing guidelines. That
amendment passed with absolutely zero input (i.e., no testimony) from the Judiciary.
- Remember the subpoenaing of the sentencing records of a federal judge called to testify before Congress who had been critical of the sentencing guidelines.
Recall the recurring threats to strip federal judges of authority
to hear certain cases, (e.g., challenges to the phrase "Under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance; or to the display of the Ten
Commandments on government property; and/or to the Defense of Marriage Act).
- Recall the threats by Congress to withhold funds to enforce
certain court decisions.
- And consider the ominous reference by Congressman Sensenbrenner of the House Judiciary Committee, in his recent Stanford speech, to the possibility of Congress establishing an
Inspector General for the federal courts.
Opposition to citing foreign law, particularly insofar as it is a oneway street (i.e., foreign courts can cite our Supreme Court, but ours
cannot cite theirs), brings to mind other instances of America's arrogance and latter day rejection of multi-Iateralism. Some might say it's
of a piece with the attitude of our current Government with respect
to:
- The Kyoto Accords (global warming);
- The new Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty;
- The International Criminal Court;
- And, yes, Iraq (where we're said to be engaged in an effort to
democratize that country).
So what, then, is the moral?

Is Our Sovereignty Really At Stake?
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It is, I would suggest, that judges, lawyers, professors, and students
of the law have to be vigilant. We must work to correct this shortsightedness. We need to keep searching for truth wherever we can
find it. We cannot, to paraphrase John Stuart Mill, rob the human
race by ignoring whatever information and wisdom foreign law
sources might hold. Of course we will never be bound by foreign law
sources and no one has ever said we should be. But if reference to
foreign sources is prohibited, posterity and the existing generation
stand to lose, including those who don't want to consider those
sources. If the foreign sources are enlightening, opponents will be
deprived of the opportunity to learn. If foreign sources are not enlightening, opponents will be losing as great a benefit-"the clearer
and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error."48
Let me return to my-what shall I call it? Parable? Of the USS
Abraham Lincoln and the radio signal from the Canadians. If reason
prevails, we can look forward to the day that most, if not all, of our
fellow citizens understand that when our Supreme Court occasionally
cites foreign law sources-that in fact it's a lighthouse out there-it's
not a menacing vessel that's trying to interfere with our progress. And
that lighthouse-containing all that foreign law-only exists to help
illuminate us along our way.
I'll close by quoting a statement made some years ago by someone
who may surprise you:
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States
exercising the power of judicial review had no precedents to
look to save their own, because our courts alone exercised
this sort of authority. When many new constitutional courts
were created after the Second World War, these courts naturally looked to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, among other sources, for developing their own law.
But now that constitutional law is solidly ground in so many
countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the decision of other constitutional courts to aid in
their own deliberative process. The United States courts,
and legal scholarship in our country generally, have been
somewhat laggard in relying on comparative law and decisions of other countries. But I predict that with so many
thriving constitutional courts in the world today ... that approach will be changed in the future. 49
.
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Who was the speaker? Our late ChiefJustice William H. Rehnquist.
He tried to pull back slightly in his later years. But he was clearly torn.
So you see, there is reason to hope.

